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Abstract
In a financial system where balance sheets are continuously marked to
market, asset price changes show up immediately as changes in net worth,
and elicit responses from financial intermediaries who adjust the size of their
balance sheets. We document evidence that marked-to-market leverage is
strongly procyclical. Such behavior has aggregate consequences. Changes
in dealer repos — the primary margin of adjustment for the aggregate bal-
ance sheets of intermediaries — forecast changes in financial market risk as
measured by the innovations in the VIX index. Aggregate liquidity can be
seen as the rate of change of the aggregate balance sheet of the financial
intermediaries.
∗A previous version of this paper was presented at the 6th BIS Annual Conference, “Finan-
cial System and Macroeconomic Resilience”, 18-19 June 2007 under its former title “Liquidity
and Financial Cycles”. We thank conference participants at the BIS conference, and seminar
participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
Princeton University, and Baruch College for their comments. The views expressed in this paper
are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York or the Federal Reserve System.
1. Introduction
In a financial system where balance sheets are continuously marked to market,
changes in asset prices show up immediately on balance sheets, and have an instant
impact on the net worth of all constituents of the financial system. The net worth
of financial intermediaries are especially sensitive to fluctuations in asset prices
given the highly leveraged nature of such intermediaries’ balance sheets.
Our focus in this paper is on the reactions of the financial intermediaries to
changes in their net worth, and the market-wide consequences of such reactions.
If financial intermediaries were passive and did not adjust their balance sheets to
changes in net worth, then leverage would fall when total assets rise. Change in
leverage and change in balance sheet size would then be negatively related.
However, as we will see below, the evidence points to a strongly positive re-
lationship between changes in leverage and changes in balance sheet size. Far
from being passive, the evidence points to financial intermediaries adjusting their
balance sheets actively, and doing so in such a way that leverage is high during
booms and low during busts. That is, leverage is procyclical.
Procyclical leverage can be seen as a consequence of the active management of
balance sheets by financial intermediaries who respond to changes in prices and
measured risk. For financial intermediaries, their models of risk and economic
capital dictate active management of their overall Value-at-Risk (VaR) through
adjustments of their balance sheets.
From the point of view of each institution, decision rules that result in pro-
cyclical leverage are readily understandable. However, there are aggregate con-
sequences of such behavior for the financial system as a whole that might not
be taken into consideration by individual institutions. We exhibit evidence that
procyclical leverage eﬀects aggregate volatility and particularly the price of risk
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of volatility.
Our paper has two main objectives. Our first objective is to document the
relationship between balance sheet size and leverage for the group of financial
intermediaries (including the major Wall Street investment banks) that operate
primarily through the capital markets. We show that leverage is strongly procycli-
cal for these intermediaries, and that the margin of adjustment on the balance
sheet is through repos and reverse repos (and other collateralized borrowing and
lending). In turn, procyclical leverage can be attributed to the bank’s capital
allocation decision that rests on measured risk ruling at the time. We find that
the value-at-risk (VaR) disclosed by the banks is an important determinant of
balance sheet stance, but we also find evidence of an additional procyclical el-
ement in leverage that operates over and above that implied by their disclosed
value-at-risk.
Our second objective is to pursue the aggregate consequences of such procycli-
cal leverage, and document evidence that expansions and contractions of balance
sheets have asset pricing consequences through shifts in financial market volatility.
In particular, we show that changes in collateralized borrowing and lending on in-
termediary’s balance sheet are significant forecasting variables for innovations in
market-wide risk as measured by the VIX index of implied volatility in the stock
market. We also decompose VIX innovations into changes of stock market volatil-
ity and changes of the diﬀerence between implied volatility and actual volatility
(the volatility risk premium). We find that dealer balance sheet changes primarily
forecast changes in the volatility risk premium, which has a natural interpreta-
tion as the price of risk of aggregate volatility. Previous work in asset pricing
has shown that innovations in market volatility are important cross sectional as-
set pricing factors (see Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006), and Adrian, and
Rosenberg (2008)), and that the volatility risk premium forecasts future equity re-
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turns (Bollerslev and Zhou (2007)). Our finding that expansions and contractions
of the balance sheets of security dealers forecast volatility innovations shows that
intermediary balance sheets matter for the aggregate pricing of risk. Consistent
with the conjectures of Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier and Peder-
sen (2007) and He and Krishnamurthy (2008), we thus document that funding
liquidity of financial intermediaries has aggregate pricing implications.
Our findings also shed light on the concept of “liquidity” as used in common
discourse about financial market conditions. In the financial press and other mar-
ket commentary, asset price booms are sometimes attributed to “excess liquidity”
in the financial system. Financial commentators are fond of using the associated
metaphors, such as the financial markets being “awash with liquidity”, or liquidity
“sloshing around”. However, the precise sense in which “liquidity” is being used
in such contexts is often left unspecified.
Our empirical findings suggest that financial market liquidity can be under-
stood as the rate of growth of aggregate balance sheets. In response to increases
in prices on the asset side of intermediaries’ balance sheets, leverage falls, and
intermediaries hold surplus capital. They will then search for uses of their surplus
capital. In a loose analogy with manufacturing firms, we may see the financial
system as having “surplus capacity”. For such surplus capacity to be utilized, the
intermediaries must expand their balance sheets. On the liabilities side, they take
on more short-term debt. On the asset side, they search for potential borrowers
that they can lend to. Financial market liquidity is intimately tied to how hard
the financial intermediaries search for borrowers.
The outline of our paper is as follows. We begin with a review of some very
basic balance sheet arithmetic on the relationship between leverage and total as-
sets. The purpose of this initial exercise is to motivate our empirical investigation
of the balance sheet changes of financial intermediaries in section 3. We argue
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that the behavior of financial intermediaries thus uncovered shed much light on
several aspects of the credit crisis of 2007/8, and in particular why the distress has
been most focused on the interbank credit market. Having outlined the facts, in
section 4, we show that changes in aggregate repo positions of the major financial
intermediaries can forecast innovations in the volatility risk-premium, where the
volatility risk premium is defined as the diﬀerence between the VIX index and re-
alized volatility. We conclude with discussions of the implications of our findings
for funding liquidity.
2. Some Basic Balance Sheet Arithmetic
What is the relationship between leverage and balance sheet size? We begin with
some very elementary balance sheet arithmetic, so as to focus ideas. Before looking
at the evidence for financial intermediaries, let us think about the relationship
between balance sheet size and leverage for a household. The household owns a
house financed with a mortgage. For concreteness, suppose the house is worth
100, the mortgage value is 90, and so the household has net worth (equity) of 10.
The initial balance sheet then is given by:
Assets Liabilities
100 10
90
Leverage is defined as the ratio of total assets to equity, hence is 100/10 = 10.
What happens to leverage as total assets fluctuate? Denote by A the market
value of total assets and E is the market value of equity. We make the simplifying
assumption that the market value of debt stays roughly constant at 90 for small
shifts in the value of total assets. Total leverage is then
L ' A
A− 90
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Leverage is inversely related to total assets. When the price of my house goes up,
my net worth increases, and so my leverage goes down. Figure 2.1 illustrates the
negative relationship between total assets and leverage. Indeed, for households,
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Figure 2.1: Leverage for passive investor
the negative relationship between total assets and leverage is clearly borne out
in the aggregate data. Figure 2.2 plots the quarterly changes in total assets to
quarterly changes in leverage as given in the Flow of Funds account for the United
States. The data are from 1963 to 2006. The scatter chart shows a strongly
negative relationship, as suggested by Figure 2.1.
We can ask the same question for firms, and we will address this question for
three diﬀerent types of firms.
• Non-financial firms
• Commercial banks
• Security brokers and dealers (including investment banks).
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Figure 2.2: Total Assets and Leverage of Household
If a firm were passive in the face of fluctuating asset prices, then leverage would
vary inversely with total assets. However, the evidence points to a more active
management of balance sheets.
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Figure 2.3: Total Assets and Leverage of Non-financial, Non-farm Corporates
Figure 2.3 is a scatter chart of the change in leverage and change in total
assets of non-financial, non-farm corporations drawn from the U.S. flow of funds
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data (1963 to 2006). The scatter chart shows much less of a negative pattern,
suggesting that companies react somewhat to changes in asset prices by shifting
their stance on leverage.1
More notable still is the analogous chart for U.S. commercial banks, again
drawn from the U.S. Flow of Funds accounts. Figure 2.4 is the scatter chart
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Figure 2.4: Total Assets and Leverage of Commercial Banks
plotting changes in leverage against changes in total assets for U.S. commercial
banks. A large number of the observations line up along the vertical line that
passes through zero change in leverage. In other words, the data show the outward
signs of commercial banks targeting a fixed leverage ratio.
However, even more striking than the scatter chart for commercial banks is that
for security dealers and brokers, that include the major Wall Street investment
banks. Figure 2.5 is the scatter chart for U.S. security dealers and brokers,
again drawn from the Flow of Funds accounts (1963 - 2006). The alignment of
the observations is now the reverse of that for households. There is a strongly
1This finding is consistent withWelch’s (2004) analysis of non-financial leverage which demon-
strates that 40 percent of leverage changes are (passively) explained by shocks to equity prices,
and 60 percent by the net issuing activity.
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Figure 2.5: Total Assets and Leverage of Security Brokers and Dealers
positive relationship between changes in total assets and changes in leverage. In
this sense, leverage is pro-cyclical.
In order to appreciate the aggregate consequences of pro-cyclical leverage, let
us first consider the behavior of a financial intermediary that manages its balance
sheet actively to as to maintain a constant leverage ratio of 10. Suppose the
initial balance sheet is as follows. The financial intermediary holds 100 worth of
securities, and has funded this holding with debt worth 90.
Assets Liabilities
Securities, 100 Equity, 10
Debt, 90
Assume that the price of debt is approximately constant for small changes in
total assets. Suppose the price of securities increases by 1% to 101.
9
Assets Liabilities
Securities, 101 Equity, 11
Debt, 90
Leverage then falls to 101/11 = 9.18. If the bank targets leverage of 10, then
it must take on additional debt of D to purchase D worth of securities on the
asset side so that
assets
equity
=
101 +D
11
= 10
The solution is D = 9. The bank takes on additional debt worth 9, and
with this money purchases securities worth 9. Thus, an increase in the price of
the security of 1 leads to an increased holding worth 9. The demand curve is
upward-sloping. After the purchase, leverage is now back up to 10.
Assets Liabilities
Securities, 110 Equity, 11
Debt, 99
The mechanism works in reverse, too. Suppose there is shock to the securities
price so that the value of security holdings falls to 109. On the liabilities side,
it is equity that bears the burden of adjustment, since the value of debt stays
approximately constant.
Assets Liabilities
Securities, 109 Equity, 10
Debt, 99
Leverage is now too high (109/10 = 10.9). The bank can adjust down its
leverage by selling securities worth 9, and paying down 9 worth of debt. Thus, a
10
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Figure 2.6: Leverage Adjustment in Upturn
fall in the price of securities of leads to sales of securities. The supply curve is
downward-sloping. The new balance sheet then looks as follows.
Assets Liabilities
Securities, 100 Equity, 10
Debt, 90
The balance sheet is now back to where it started before the price changes.
Leverage is back down to the target level of 10.
Leverage targeting entails upward-sloping demands and downward-sloping sup-
plies. The perverse nature of the demand and supply curves are even stronger
when the leverage of the financial intermediary is pro-cyclical - that is, when
leverage is high during booms and low during busts. When the securities price
goes up, the upward adjustment of leverage entails purchases of securities that
are even larger than that for the case of constant leverage. If, in addition, there
is the possibility of feedback, then the adjustment of leverage and price changes
will reinforce each other in an amplification of the financial cycle.
If financial markets are not perfectly liquid so that greater demand for the
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Figure 2.7: Leverage Adjustment in Downturn
asset tends to put upward pressure on its price, then there is the potential for
a feedback eﬀect in which stronger balance sheets feed greater demand for the
asset, which in turn raises the asset’s price and lead to stronger balance sheets.
Figure 2.6 illustrates the feedback during a boom. The mechanism works exactly
in reverse in downturns.
If financial markets are not perfectly liquid so that greater supply of the asset
tends to put downward pressure on its price, then there is the potential for a
feedback eﬀect in which weaker balance sheets lead to greater sales of the asset,
which depresses the asset’s price and lead to even weaker balance sheets. Figure
2.7 illustrates the feedback during a downturn.
In section 4, we return to the issue of feedback by exhibiting evidence that is
consistent with the amplification eﬀects sketched above. We will see that changes
in key balance sheet components forecast changes in the VIX index of implied
volatility in the stock market.
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3. A First Look at the Evidence
3.1. Investment Bank Balance Sheets
To set the stage for our empirical study, we begin by examining the quarterly
changes in the balance sheets of five large investment banks, as listed below in
Table 1. The data are from the regulatory filings with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on their 10-K and 10-Q forms.
Table 1: Investment Banks
Name Sample
Bear Stearns 1997 Q1 — 2008 Q1
Goldman Sachs 1999 Q2 — 2008 Q1
Lehman Brothers 1993 Q2 — 2008 Q1
Merrill Lynch 1991 Q1 — 2008 Q1
Morgan Stanley 1997 Q2 — 2008 Q1
Our choice of these five banks is motivated by our concern to examine “pure
play” investment banks that are not part of bank holding companies so as to focus
attention on their behavior with respect to the capital markets2. Citigroup re-
ported its investment banking operations separately from its commercial banking
operations until 2004 as “Citigroup Global Markets”, and we have data for the
period 1998Q1 to 2004Q4. In some of our charts below, we will report Citigroup
Global Markets for comparison. The stylized balance sheet of an investment bank
is as follows.
Assets Liabilities
Trading assets Short positions
Reverse repos Repos
Other assets Long term debt
Shareholder equity
2Hence, we do not include JP Morgan Chase, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, and other
brokerage operations that are part of a larger commercial bank.
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On the asset side, traded assets are valued at market prices, or are short term
collateralized loans (such as reverse repos) for which the discrepancy between face
value and market value are very small due to the very short term nature of the
loans. On the liabilities side, short positions are at market values, and repos are
very short term borrowing. We will return to a more detailed descriptions of
repos and reverse repos below. Long-term debt is typically a small fraction of the
balance sheet for investment banks.3 For these reasons, investment banks provide
a good approximation of the balance sheet that is continuously marked to market,
and hence provide insights into how leverage changes with balance sheet size.
The second reason for our study of investment banks lies in their continuously
increasing significance for the financial system.
Total Financial Assets of Financial Intermediaries
as % of Commercial Bank Total Assets
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Source: 
Total financial assets of Security Brokers and Dealers are from table L.129 of the Flow of Funds, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.
Total financial assets of Bank Holding Companies are from table L.112 of the Flow of Funds, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.
Total Assets Under Management of Hedge Funds are from HFR. 
Figure 3.1: Total Financial Intermediary Assets
3The balance sheet of Lehman Brothers as of November 2005 shows that short positions are
around a quarter of total assets, and long term debt is an even smaller fraction. Shareholder
equity is around 4% of total assets (implying leverage of around 25). Short-term borrowing in
terms of repurchase agreements and other collateralized borrowing takes up the remainder.
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Figure 3.1 plots the size of securities firms’ balance sheets relative to that of
commercial banks. We also plot the assets under management for hedge funds,
although we should be mindful that “assets under management” refers to total
investor equity, rather than the size of the balance sheet. To obtain total bal-
ance sheet size, we should multiply by hedge fund leverage (which is not readily
available). Figure 3.1 shows that when expressed as a proportion of commercial
banks’ balance sheets, securities firms have been increasing their balance sheets
at a very rapid rate. Note that when hedge funds’ assets under management is
converted to balance sheet size by multiplying by a conservative leverage factor of
2, the combined balance sheets of investment banks and hedge funds is over 50%
of commercial banks balance sheets.
Size is not the only issue. When balance sheets are marked to market, the
responses to price changes may entail responses that may be disproportionately
large. LTCM’s balance sheet was small relative to the total financial sector, but its
impact would have been underestimated if only size had been taken into account.
Similarly, the size of the sub-prime mortgage exposures was small relative to the
liabilities of the financial system as a whole, but the credit crisis of 2007/2008
demonstrates that its impact can be large. Table 2 gives the summary statistics
of the investment banks over the sample period.
[Table 2]
We begin with the key question left hanging from the previous section. What
is the relationship between leverage and total assets? The answer is provided in
the scatter charts in figure 3.2. We have included the scatter chart for Citigroup
Global Markets (1998Q1 - 2004Q4) for comparison, although Citigroup does not
figure in the panel regressions reported below. The scatter chart shows the growth
in assets and leverage at a quarterly frequency. In all cases, leverage is large when
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Figure 3.2: Total Assets and Leverage
total assets are large. Leverage is pro-cyclical.
There are some notable common patterns in the scatter charts, but also some
notable diﬀerences. The events of 1998 are clearly evident in the scatter charts.
The early part of the year saw strong growth in total assets, with the attendant
increase in leverage. However, the third and fourth quarters of 1998 shows all
the hallmarks of financial distress and the attendant retrenchment in the balance
sheet. For most banks, there were very large contractions in balance sheet size in
1998Q4, accompanied by large falls in leverage. These points are on the bottom
left hand corners of the respective scatter charts, showing large contractions in
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the balance sheet and decrease in leverage. Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch
seem especially hard hit in 1998Q4.
However, there are also some notable diﬀerences. It is notable, for instance,
that for Citigroup Global Markets, the large retrenchment seems to have happened
in the third quarter of 1998, rather than in the final quarter of 1998. Such a
retrenchment would be consistent with the closing down of the former Salomon
Brothers fixed income arbitrage desk on July 6th 1998, following the acquisition
of the operation by Travelers Group (later, Citigroup). Many commentators see
this event as the catalyst for the sequence of events that eventually led to the
demise of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) and the associated financial
distress in the summer and early autumn of 1998.4
Figure 3.3 aggregates the individual scatter charts by taking the asset-weighted
average of changes in balance sheet size and leverage. The upward-sloping re-
lationship between changes in assets and changes in leverage is clearer. The
45-degree line in the scatter chart corresponds to the combination of points where
the total equity value remains constant. This is because leverage growth is de-
fined as the log diﬀerence in assets minus log diﬀerence in equity. Hence, the 45
degree line corresponds to the points where the log diﬀerence in equity is zero.
The set of points below the 45 degree line corresponds to the observations in which
equity fell. This explains why the observations for the third and fourth quarters
of 2007 appear below the 45 degree line, as banks announced credit losses on their
mortgage portfolios. More interestingly, there is a striking contrast between what
happened in 1998 following the LTCM crisis and the credit crisis of 2007/8. As
of the first quarter of 2008, there has not been the same type of contraction of
balance sheets as was observed in the 1998 crisis. This diﬀerence holds the key to
4The oﬃcial account (BIS, 1999) is given in the report of the CGFS of the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (the so-called “Johnson Report”). Popular accounts, such as Lowenstein
(2000) give a description of the background and personalities.
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Figure 3.3: Aggregate Leverage and Total Asset Growth
several distinctive characteristics of the crisis of 2007/8. We return to this issue
in section 3.3.
Table 3 shows the results of a panel regression for change in leverage. The
negative relationship between the change in leverage and change in total assets is
confirmed in the final column (v) of Table 3. The coeﬃcient on lagged leverage (i.e.
previous quarter’s leverage) is negative, showing that leverage is mean-reverting
(column i). Leverage is positively related Value-at-Risk (column ii), as increases
in leverage generally increase the Value-at-Risk of total assets.
[Table 3]
More interestingly, the regressions reveal which items on the balance sheet are
adjusting when balance sheets expand and contract. In particular, the regressions
show that the margin of adjustment in the expansion and contraction of balance
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sheets is through repos. In a repurchase agreement (repo), an institution sells a
security while simultaneously agreeing to buy it back at a pre-agreed price on a
fixed future date. Such an agreement is tantamount to a collateralized loan, with
the interest on the loan being the excess of the repurchase price over the sale price.
From the perspective of the funds lender — the party who buys the security with
the undertaking to re-sell it later — such agreements are called reverse repos. For
the buyer, the transaction is equivalent to granting a loan, secured on collateral.
Column (iv) of Table 3 shows that repo growth explains 43% of the variation of
leverage growth. In addition, Table 3 shows that repos are the largest form of
debt on investment banks balance sheets. Adjustments in total assets and hence
leverage are primarily done via repos, as is visible in chart 3.4.
Repos and reverse repos are important financing activities that provide the
funds and securities needed by investment banks to take positions in financial
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markets. For example, a bank taking a long position by buying a security needs
to deliver funds to the seller when the security is received on settlement day. If
the dealer does not fully finance the security out of its own capital, then it needs
to borrow funds. The purchased security is typically used as collateral for the
cash borrowing. When the bank sells the security, the sale proceeds can be used
to repay the lender.
Reverse repos are loans made by the investment bank against collateral. The
bank’s prime brokerage business vis-a`-vis hedge funds will figure prominently in
the reverse repo numbers. The scatter chart gives a glimpse into the way in
which changes in leverage are achieved through expansions and contractions in
the collateralized borrowing and lending. We saw in our illustrative section on
the elementary balance sheet arithmetic that when a bank wishes to expand its
balance sheet, it takes on additional debt, and with the proceeds of this borrowing
takes on more assets. The expansion and contraction of total assets via repos is
plotted in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5 plots the change in assets against change in collateralized borrowing
for each of the investment banks. The positive relationship in the scatter plot
confirms our panel regression finding that balance sheet changes are accompanied
by changes in short term borrowing.
Figure 3.6 plots the change in repos against the change in reverse repos. A
dealer taking a short position by selling a security it does not own needs to deliver
the security to the buyer on the settlement date. This can be done by borrowing
the needed security, and providing cash or other securities as collateral. When the
dealer closes out the short position by buying the security, the borrowed security
can be returned to the securities lender. The scatter plot in figure 3.6 suggests
that repos and reverse repos play such a role as counterparts in the balance sheet.
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Figure 3.5: Total Assets and Repos
3.2. Value-at-Risk
Procyclical leverage is not a term that the banks themselves are likely to use in
describing what they do, although this is in fact what they are doing. To get a
better handle on what motivates the banks in their actions, we explore the role of
Value-at-Risk (VaR) in explaining the banks’ balance sheet decisions.
For a random variable A, the Value-at-Risk at confidence level c relative to
some base level A0 is defined as the smallest non-negative number V aR such that
Prob (A < A0 − V aR) ≤ 1− c
For instance, A could be the total marked-to-market assets of the firm at some
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Figure 3.6: Repos and Reverse Repos
given time horizon. Then the Value-at-Risk is the equity capital that the firm
must hold in order to stay solvent with probability c. Financial intermediaries
publish their Value-at-Risk numbers as part of their regulatory filings, and also
regularly disclose such numbers through their annual reports. Their economic
capital is tied to the overall Value-at-Risk of the whole firm, where the confidence
level is set at a level high enough to target a given credit rating (typically A or
AA).
If financial intermediaries adjust their balance sheets to target a ratio of Value-
at-Risk to economic capital, then we may conjecture that their disclosed Value-
at-Risk figures would be informative in reconstructing their actions. If the bank
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maintains capital K to meet total Value-at-Risk, then we have
K = λ× V aR (3.1)
where λ is the proportion of capital that the intermediary holds per unit of V aR.
The proportionality λ is potentially time varying. Hence, leverage L satisfies
L =
A
K
=
1
λ
× A
V aR
=
1
λ
× 1
V
where V is the unit value-at-risk, defined as the value-at-risk per dollar of assets.
Procyclical leverage then follows directly from the counter -cyclical nature of unit
value-at-risk. Measured risk is low during booms and high during busts.
We can indeed see this counter-cyclical relationship in the data. In figure
3.7, we plot the unit value-at-risk against total assets, having removed the fixed
eﬀects for individual banks. We see that the relationship is downward sloping.
We highlight 2007Q4 and 2008Q1 for Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, as they
are clear outliers in the plot. The high levels of unit value-at-risk for these
two investment banks at the height of the credit crisis is suggestive of balance
sheets that are under considerable stress. Shortly after filing its 10-Q form for
the first quarter of 2008, Bear Stearns suﬀered its run, and was acquired by J.P.
Morgan Chase with the assistance of the Federal Reserve. We will return to a
more detailed description of the 2007/8 credit crisis below, in section 3.3.
In Figure 3.8 we plot the evolution of the average unit value-at-risk over time.
We see again that the average unit value-at-risk increased sharply in 2007Q4 and
2008Q1.
Equation (3.1) also suggests that the ratio of Value-at-Risk to shareholder
equity may be an informative series to track over time. The naive hypothesis would
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Figure 3.7: VaR and Total Assets
be that this ratio is kept constant over time by the bank. The naive hypothesis
also ties in neatly the regulatory capital requirements under the 1996 Market Risk
Amendment of the Basel capital accord. Under this rule, the regulatory capital
is 3 times the 10 day, 99% Value-at-Risk.
In Figures 3.9 we plot the evolution of the VaR/equity ratio and leverage
over time. The Value-at-Risk numbers are reported in the 10-K and 10-Q filings
since 2001. We can see that both ratios–VaR/Equity and Leverage–are fairly
constant before 2007, with the exception of Goldman Sachs, which exhibits a
marked increase in leverage. In 2007, both leverage and the VaR/equity ratio
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increased markedly for most banks. In Figure 3.10 we plot average leverage for
all banks since 1992. There are two peaks in the evolution of leverage over time,
one prior to the LTCM crisis of 1998, and a second peak during the 2007/2008
mortgage crisis.
Table 4 presents the regressions for the quarterly change in the ratio of Value-
at-Risk to equity. For the reasons outlined already, the firm’s self-assessed Value-
at-Risk is closely tied to its assessment of economic capital, and we would expect
behavior to be heavily influenced by changes in Value-at-Risk.
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[Table 4]
The lagged Value-at-Risk to equity ratio is strongly negative, with coeﬃcients
in the range of −0.5 to −0.6, suggesting rapid reversion to the mean. We take
this as evidence that the banks use VaR as a cue for how they adjust their balance
sheets. However, the naive hypothesis that banks maintain a fixed ratio of Value-
at-Risk to equity does not seem to be supported in the data. Column (ii) of
Table 4 suggests that an increase in the Value-at-Risk to equity ratio coincides
with periods when the bank increases its leverage. Value-at-Risk to equity is
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procyclical, when measured relative to leverage. However, total assets have a
negative sign in column (v). It appears that Value-at-Risk to equity is procyclical,
but total assets adjust down some of the eﬀects captured in leverage. The evidence
points to an additional, procyclical risk appetite component to banks’ exposures
that goes beyond the simple hypothesis of targeting a normalized Value-at-Risk
measure.
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3.3. Credit Crisis of 2007/8
The scatter chart given by figure 3.3 also gives clues on some peculiar features
of the credit crisis of 2007/8. Note the contrast between the drastic shrinking
of assets and leverage 1998Q4 associated with the LTCM crisis and the course so
far of the credit crisis that began in the summer of 2007. While balance sheets
contracted sharply in 1998, there has not (yet) been a comparable contraction
of balance sheets in the crisis of 2007/8. Understanding the reasons for the
diﬀerence between 1998 and 2007 holds the key to unlocking some of the mysteries
surrounding the drying up of the interbank credit market in the summer of 2007.
One of those mysteries is the fact that some financial markets (notably the stock
market, and the market for high grade corporate debt) have held up relatively well
throughout the crisis, while the interbank credit markets have suﬀered unusually
severe stresses.
For instance, the LIBOR spread has been consistently high during the whole
crisis - even as the acute distress at around the time of the Bear Stearns demise
began to dissipate in April 2008. Figure 3.11 shows that while the dollar LIBOR
rate has generally tracked the Fed Funds rate down as the Federal Reserve has
cut interest rates aggressively, the spreads have been volatile and very large.
One conjecture for why bank balance sheets did not contract sharply in 2007Q3
and Q4 as they did in 1998 is that the banks were not at liberty to do so due to
the liquidity lines they oﬀered to their oﬀ-balance sheet vehicles. The beginnings
of the credit problems of 2007 were first manifested by falling prices of securities
that are associated with the subprime mortgage sector. The falls in the prices
of securities proceeded into July of 2007, and were accompanied by increases in
measured risks. In particular, the oﬀ balance sheet SIVs (structured investment
vehicles) and conduits that had been set up to buy large quantities of subprime
mortgage related assets began to experience diﬃculties in rolling over their asset-
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Figure 3.11: LIBOR rates
backed commercial paper liabilities. Many of the conduits and SIVs had been set
up with back-up liquidity lines from banks, and such liquidity lines were beginning
to be tapped by the end of July and early August.
The tapping of the credit lines were happening at precisely the moment that
the risk constraints were binding harder for the banking sector. Tighter value
at risk constraints translated to higher shadow value of capital and hence to the
desired contraction of balance sheets. Contracting balance sheets of hedge funds
and other holders of asset backed commercial paper (ABCPs) led to a fall in the
demand for the liabilities issued by SIVs and conduits. In late July and early
August 2007, SIVs and conduits began to experience diﬃculties in rolling over
their short term liabilities.
Furthermore, as credit lines got tapped, the balance sheet constraint at the
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banks began to bind even harder, making them even more reluctant to lend.
For some banks, their reputational concerns induced them to bring back on to
the balance sheet the assets that were held previously oﬀ balance sheet in the
various conduits and SIVs. In eﬀect, the banks were “lending against their
will”. The fact that bank balance sheets did not contract is indicative of the
involuntary expansion of the banks’ balance sheets. One of the consequences of
such involuntary expansion was that they sought other ways to curtail lending.
Their natural response was to cut oﬀ lending that was discretionary. The seizing
up of the interbank credit market can thus be seen as the conjunction of:
• Desired contraction of balance sheets
• “Involuntary” lending due to the tapping of credit lines by oﬀ balance sheet
entities and return of assets back on to the banks’ balance sheets.
One corroborating piece of evidence for the hypothesis that the stresses in the
interbank market have been caused by the “involuntary” lending by the banks is
the unusually large spreads on “jumbo” mortgages - i.e. those non-conforming
mortgages that do not qualify for the guarantees oﬀered by the government spon-
sored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Figure 3.12 shows the jumbo
spread going back to 1998. We can see that the currently very high spreads are
much higher than past episodes of financial distress, including the 1998 crisis, Y2K
and 9/11. Moreover, the spreads have increased since the run on Bear Stearns in
March 2008. We see the behavior of the jumbo spread as evidence of the lack of
credit capacity on the financial intermediaries’ balance sheets, following the large
scale write-downs due to credit losses. Although the banks have been successful
in raising some new capital, the evidence is that the capital raised so far has not
been enough to relieve the balance sheet constraints.
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Figure 3.12: Jumbo Mortgage Spreads
4. Forecasting Risk Appetite
We now explore the asset pricing consequences of balance sheet expansion and
contraction. We have already noted how the demand and supply responses to
price changes can amplify asset price movements when financial intermediaries’
actions result in leverage that co-vary positively with the financial cycle. We
exhibit empirical evidence that the waxing and waning of balance sheets have a
direct impact on asset prices through the ease with which traders, hedge funds
and other users of credit can obtain funding for trades.
So far, we have used quarterly data drawn either from the balance sheets of
individual financial intermediaries or the aggregate balance sheet items from the
Flow of Funds accounts. However, for the purpose of tracking the financial market
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consequences of balance sheet adjustments, data at a higher frequency are more
useful. For this reason, we use the weekly data on the primary dealer repo and
reverse repo positions compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The
primary dealer data have previously been analyzed by Adrian and Fleming (2005)
and Kambhu (2006).
Primary dealers are the dealers with whom the Federal Reserve has an on-going
trading relationship in the course of daily business. The primary dealers comprise
the five investment banks studied earlier in the paper, as well as commercial and
foreign banks that own security broker and dealers. Currently 20 intermediaries
are primary dealers.5 The Federal Reserve collects data that cover transactions,
positions, financing, and settlement activities in U.S. Treasury securities, agency
debt securities, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and corporate debt securities
for the primary dealers. The data are used by the Fed to monitor dealer per-
formance and market conditions, and are also consolidated and released publicly
on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York website6. The dealers supply market
information to the Fed as one of several responsibilities to maintain their primary
dealer designation and hence their trading relationship with the Fed. The pri-
mary dealer data provide a valuable window on the overall market, at a frequency
(every week) that is much higher than the usual quarterly reporting cycle.
Dealers gather information at the close of business each Wednesday, on their
financing activities over the previous week. Data are then submitted on the fol-
lowing day (that is, Thursday) to the Federal Reserve. Summary data are released
publicly by the Federal Reserve each Thursday, one week after they are collected.
The data are aggregated across all dealers, and are only available by asset class.
Repos and reverse repos are a subset of the security financing data. Financ-
5A list of current primary dealers can be found at:
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers current.html.
6www.newyorkfed.org/markets/primarydealers.html
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ing distinguishes between “securities in” and “securities out” for each asset class.
“Securities in” refer to securities received by a dealer in a financing arrangement
(against other securities or cash), whereas “securities out” refer to securities de-
livered by a dealer in a financing arrangement (be it against securities or cash).
For example, if a dealer enters into a repo, in which it borrows funds and provides
securities as collateral, it would report securities out. Repos and reverse repos are
reported across all sectors. The actual financing numbers reported are the funds
paid or received. In the case of a repo, for example, a dealer reports the actual
funds received on the settlement of the starting leg of the repo, and not the value
of the pledged securities. In cases where only securities are exchanged, the market
value of the pledged securities is reported. Adrian and Fleming (2005) provide
more detail about the data.
[Table 5]
We use the weekly repo and reverse repo data to forecast financial market
conditions in the following week. Our measure of financial market conditions is the
VIX index of the weighted average of the implied volatility in the S&P500 index
options. The VIX index reflects aggregate financial market volatility, as well as
the price of risk of market volatility. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) show
that VIX innovations are significant pricing factors for the cross section of equity
returns, and Bollerslev and Zhou (2007) show that the volatility risk premium
–the diﬀerence between the VIX and realized volatility of the S&P500 index –
forecasts equity returns better than other commonly used forecasting variables
(such as the P/E ratio or the term spread). We provide summary statistics of the
primary dealer data, and the volatility data in Table 5.
We use the daily VIX data from the website of the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (www.cboe.com/micro/vix), and compute the S&P500 volatility from
33
daily data over weekly windows. We compute the volatility risk premium as
the diﬀerence between implied volatility and realized volatility. This risk pre-
mium is closely linked to the payoﬀ to volatility swaps, which are zero investment
derivatives that return the diﬀerence between realized future volatility and implied
volatility over the maturity of the swap (see Carr and Wu (2007) for an analysis
of variance and volatility swaps). We then compute averages of the VIX and the
variance risk premium over each week (from the close of Wednesday to the close
of the following Tuesday).
The growth rate of repos on dealers balance sheets significantly forecast in-
novations in the VIX. This can be seen in columns (ii)-(vi) of Table 6. We
report forecasting regressions for VIX changes over the next week, as well as
the Wednesday-Thursday, Wednesday-Friday, and Thursday-Friday changes. The
forecasting results are significant at the 1% level for volatility innovations over the
next week, and at the 5% for volatility innovations over shorter time periods. The
forecasting R2 increases from 8.9% when only the past VIX level is used, column
(i), to 11.6% when repo changes are included in the forecast. We believe the latter
result (the significant forecasting power of dealer’s repo growth for innovations in
implied volatility) to be important. The forecasting result also holds for reverse
repos, consistent with the notion that it is the total size of the balance sheet that
matters for aggregate liquidity.
[Table 6]
In order to gain a better understanding what is determining the forecasting
result, we also run the forecasting regressions for S&P500 volatility and the volatil-
ity risk premium (columns vii-x). We see that it is the volatility risk premium
that is being forecast, not actual equity volatility. Adjustments to the size of
financial intermediary balance sheets via repos thus forecasts the price of risk of
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Figure 4.1: Implied Volatility and lagged Repos
aggregate volatility, rather than aggregate volatility itself. We provide a graphical
illustration of the forecasting power of repos as a scatter chart in Figure 4.1.
We can put forward the following economic rationale for the forecasting re-
gressions presented here. When balance sheets expand through the increased col-
lateralized lending and borrowing by financial intermediaries, the newly released
funding resources then chase available assets for purchase. More capital is de-
ployed in increasing trading positions through the chasing of yield, and the selling
of the “tails”, as in the selling volatility via options. If the increased funding for
asset purchases result in the generalized increase in prices and risk appetite in the
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financial system, then the expansion of balance sheets will eventually be reflected
in the asset price changes in the financial system - hence, the ability of changes
in repo positions to forecast future volatility, and particularly the volatility risk
premium.
5. Related Literature
The managing of leverage is closely to the bank’s attempt to target a particular
credit rating. To the extent that the “passive” credit rating should fluctuate
with the financial cycle, the fact that a bank’s credit rating remains constant
through the cycle suggests that banks manage their leverage actively, so as to shed
exposures during downturns. Kashyap and Stein (2003) draw implications from
such behavior for the pro-cyclical impact of the Basel II bank capital requirements.
To the extent that balance sheets play a central role in our paper, our discussion
here is related to the large literature on the amplification of financial shocks.
The literature has distinguished two distinct channels. The first is the increased
credit that operates through the borrower’s balance sheet, where increased lending
comes from the greater creditworthiness of the borrower (Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, 2005)). The second is the channel that operates
through the banks’ balance sheets, either through the liquidity structure of the
banks’ balance sheets (Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Kashyap and Stein (2000)),
or the cushioning eﬀect of the banks’ capital (Van den Heuvel (2002)). Our
discussion is closer to the latter group in that we also focus on the intermediaries’
balance sheets. However, the added insight from our discussions is on the way
that marking to market enhances the role of market prices, and the responses that
price changes elicit from intermediaries.
Our results are also related to the developing theoretical literature on the role
of liquidity in asset pricing (Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Allen and Gale (2004),
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Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005, 2007), Morris
and Shin (2004), Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2007a, 2007b)). The common
thread is the relationship between funding conditions and the resulting market
prices of assets. The theme of financial distress examined here is also closely
related to the literature on liquidity drains that deal with events such as the stock
market crash of 1987 and the LTCM crisis in the summer of 1998. Gennotte
and Leland (1990) and Geanakoplos (2003) provide analyses that are based on
competitive equilibrium.
The impact of remuneration schemes on the amplifications of the financial
cycle have been addressed recently by Rajan (2005). The agency problems within
a financial institution holds important clues on how we may explain procyclical
behavior. Stein (1997) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) present analyses of the
capital budgeting problem within banks in the presence of agency problems.
The possibility that a market populated with Value-at-Risk (VaR) constrained
traders may have more pronounced fluctuations has been examined by Danielsson,
Shin and Zigrand (2004). Mark-to-market accounting may at first appear to be
an esoteric question on measurement, but we have seen that it has potentially
important implications for financial cycles. Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2008) present
a microeconomic model that compares the performance of marking to market and
historical cost accounting systems.
6. Concluding Remarks
Aggregate liquidity can be understood as the rate of growth of the aggregate
financial sector balance sheet. When asset prices increase, financial intermedi-
aries’ balance sheets generally become stronger, and–without adjusting asset
holdings–their leverage tends to be too low. The financial intermediaries then
hold surplus capital, and they will attempt to find ways in which they can employ
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their surplus capital. In analogy with manufacturing firms, we may see the finan-
cial system as having “surplus capacity”. For such surplus capacity to be utilized,
the intermediaries must expand their balance sheets. On the liability side, they
take on more short-term debt. On the asset side, they search for potential borrow-
ers. Aggregate liquidity is intimately tied to how hard the financial intermediaries
search for borrowers. In the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States we
have seen that when balance sheets are expanding fast enough, even borrowers
that do not have the means to repay are granted credit–so intense is the urge to
employ surplus capital. The seeds of the subsequent downturn in the credit cycle
are thus sown.
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Panel A: US$ Millions Mean Std Dev Min Median Max Obs
Total Assets 335899 207065 97302 278741 876881 64
Total Liabilities 322121 199467 93111 268311 847335 64
Equity 13013 8185 3426 10611 30920 64
Reverse Repos and other 
Collateralized Lending 131972 77747 34216 115881 314715 64
 Reverse Repos 63185 29322 19097 55699 135830 64
Repos and other Collateralized 
Borrowing 104353 59292 29423 88510 263724 64
 Repos 97099 40767 54682 82697 202372 52
Trading VaR 48 16 29 46 92 28
Panel B: Quarterly Growth Mean Std Dev Min Median Max Obs
Total Assets 4% 5% -15% 4% 16% 63
Total Liabilities 4% 6% -15% 4% 17% 63
Equity 3% 3% -5% 3% 8% 63
Reverse Repos and other 
Collateralized Lending 4% 7% -19% 3% 21% 63
 Reverse Repos 3% 9% -16% 2% 28% 63
Repos and other Collateralized 
Borrowing 3% 9% -26% 4% 21% 63
 Repos 2% 9% -19% 1% 19% 52
Trading VaR 4% 9% -25% 5% 19% 27
This Table reports aggregate balance sheet items for the five investment banks of Table 1. In Panel A, we report time series
summary statistics for the cross sectional average of the balance sheet items. In Panel B, we report the summary statistics of
quarterly grwoth rates which are weighted by the total assets cross sectionally.
Table 2: Investment Bank Summary Statistics
(i) (ii) (iv) (v)
Leverage (log lag) coef -0.08 0.01 -0.06 -0.03
p-value 0.00 0.88 0.08 0.02
Trading VaR (quarterly growth) coef 0.07
p-value 0.01
Repos (quarterly growth) coef 0.22
p-value 0.00
Total Assets (quarterly growth) coef 0.83
p-value 0.00
Constant coef 0.28 -0.02 0.12 0.08
p-value 0.00 0.92 0.04 0.07
Observations 228 107 191 228
Number of Banks 5 5 5 5
R-squared 5% 8% 24% 63%
Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Leverage (quarterly growth)
Table 3: Explaining Leverage
This table reports panel regressions of quarterly leverage growth rates on the lagged level of
leverage, the growth rates of trading VaRs, the growth rates of repos, and the growth rates of
total assets. Leverage is computed from the balance sheets of the five investment banks from
Table 1 whose summary statistics are reported in Table 2. Leverage is defined as the ratio of
total assets to book equity. All of the balance sheet data is from the 10-K and 10-Q filings of
the banks with the Security and Exchange Commission. 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Trading VaR / Equity (log lag) coef -0.66 -0.59 -0.62 -0.65
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Leverage (quarterly growth) coef 1.31 2.11
p-value 0.00 0.00
Total Assets (quarterly growth) coef -0.04 -1.63
p-value 0.90 0.00
Constant coef -4.04 -3.65 -3.68 -3.96
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 106 106 106 106
Number of i 5 5 5 5
R-squared 23% 32% 24% 43%
Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Trading VaR / Equity (quarterly growth)
Table 4: Explaining the VaR/Equity Ratio
This table reports panel regressions of quarterly growth rates of the ratio of VaR to equity on the
lagged level of leverage, the growth rates of trading VaRs, and the growth rates of total assets. The
data is for the five investment banks from Table 1 whose summary statistics are reported in Table 2.
All of the balance sheet data is from the 10-K and 10-Q filings of the banks with the Security and
Exchange Commission. 
Panel A: US$ Billions Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs
Reverse Repos and other Collateralized Lending 1708 1026 397 4227 926
 Reverse Repos 1252 702 332 2972 926
Repos and other Collateralized Borrowing 1792 1087 382 4616 926
 Repos 1736 1086 369 4567 926
Net Repos 484 396 21 1600 926
Panel B: Weekly Growth Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs
Reverse Repos and other Collateralized Lending 17% 207% -1075% 1266% 925
 Reverse Repos 19% 265% -1410% 1471% 925
Repos and other Collateralized Borrowing 18% 215% -1076% 1360% 925
 Repos 19% 222% -1159% 1344% 925
Net Repos 40% 437% -2429% 5356% 925
Table 5: Primary Dealer Financing Summary Statistics
This Table reports summary statistics of collateralized financing by the Federal Reserve's Primary Dealers from form FR2004 for
January 3, 1990 - April 2, 2008. 
Wed-Thur Wed-Fri Thur-Tues
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x)
Implied Volatility coef -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.45 -0.45 -0.78 -0.79
(lag) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Repos coef -0.28 -0.05 -0.05 -0.15 0.01 -0.14
(lagged growth) p-value 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.87 0.04
Reverse Repos coef -0.24
(lagged growth) p-value 0.00
Net Repos coef -0.06
(lagged growth) p-value 0.01
Constant coef 1.95 1.85 1.82 1.93 0.13 0.35 1.15 4.99 4.90 6.22 6.29
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared (adj.) 4.9% 9.0% 9.1% 5.5% 0.5% 1.0% 4.7% 22.3% 22.0% 39.1% 39.7%
           One week average           
Implied Volatility (Change) Volatility (Change)
Table 6: Forecasting Volatility
This table reports forecasting regressions of VIX implied volatility changes, S&P500 volatility changes, and the volatility risk premium on lagged growth
rates of repo, reverse repo, and net repo positions of U.S. Primary Dealers. The VIX is computed from the cross section of S&P500 index option prices by
the Chicago Board of Options Exchange. We compute weekly volatility from S&P500 returns. The volatility risk premium is the difference between the
average VIX over the week and S&P500 volatility for the same week. Summary statistics of the Primary Dealer financing data are given in Table 5. The
data is weekly from January 3, 1990 - April 2, 2008. P-values are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
Volatility Risk Premium
(Change)
